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OVERVIEW

Few areas of law have been as affected by the dawn of the Internet
age as copyright law. The ease and speed with which copywritten material can be transmitted through cyberspace makes detection and termination of copyright violations a daunting task. Legislative efforts to
adapt copyright law to the new realities of the Internet have been outpaced by the rapid transformation of software and hardware technology,
which permits the circumvention of existing legal mechanisms designed
to protect intellectual property rights.
One of the industries most concerned about the Internet's impact on
intellectual property rights is the music and recording industry ["the music industry"]. Its main representative, the Recording Industry Associa-
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tion of America ("RIAA"),' has expended substantial energy over the last
few years to identify and combat Internet-based music piracy. 2 But the
RIAA now faces the greatest challenge of its 48-year history, a challenge
made particularly remarkable by the fact that it has come from a
fledgling Internet company founded just over a year ago by a nineteenyear-old. This company, Napster, facilitates the process by which music
files can be located and downloaded electronically and, in so doing, has
the potential to radically transform the business paradigm under which
the music industry currently operates.
The RIAA has responded to the Napster threat by helping several
record companies file suit against Napster, alleging contributory copy3
right infringement and vicarious liability for copyright infringement.
The RIAA's lawsuit, which was filed on December 9, 1999, touches upon
the gray area of copyright law that tries to strike a balance between protecting intellectual property in cyberspace while shielding Internet Service Providers (ISPs) from liability for the unauthorized actions of their
users. As such, the resolution of this case has far-reaching implications
for the future of property rights in cyberspace, even beyond the music
industry. Television and film companies correctly view the Napster dispute as a glimpse into their own future. 4 Presently, high-quality video
files are too large to be sent quickly over most Internet connections, but
faster transmission services will soon threaten the status quo in their
5
industries as well.
This paper will use the Napster controversy as a platform from
which to discuss a fascinating new technology and to better understand
1. The RIAA represents 90% of the music industry and is responsible for the licensing
and sale of music materials. See RIAA, Frequently Asked Questions (last modified May 26,
2000) <http://www.riaa.com/About-Who.CFM>.
2. See Don Clark, Recording Industry Group Sues Napster, Alleging Copyright Infringement on Net, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1999, at B18, available in 1999 WL 24925087.
3. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., No. 99-5183 (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 6, 1999). In
this lawsuit, the RIAA is assisting the record companies A&M Records, Geffen Records,
Interscope Records, Sony Music Entertainment, MCA Records, Atlantic Recording Corp.,
Island Records, Motown Record Co., Capital Records, La Face Records, BMG Music d/b/a/
The RCA Records Label, Universal Records, Elektra Entertainment Group, Arista Records,
Sire Records Group, Polygram Records, Virgin Records America, and Warner Bros.

Records. Id.
4. Benny Evangelista, Entertainment Companies are Alarmed by Online Programs
that Let Anyone Copy Music and Movies, THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Apr. 3, 2000, at
El (noting the development of DivX, a program that can copy and compress a full-length
DVD film into a file that can fit onto a standard 650 MB3 CD-ROM).
5. See Amy Harmon, Potent Software Escalates Music Industry's Jitters,N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 7, 2000, at Al; David Weekly, Three Days of MIRC (visited Apr. 27, 2000) <http://
david.weekly.org/writings/mirc.php3> (noting that MIRC, an Internet Relay Chat system,
already enables sophisticated Internet users to transfer video files); See also Evangelista,
supra note 4, at El.
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copyright law in the Internet age. The Overview is followed by a brief
discussion of music piracy over the Internet in Section II. Section III
discusses why Napster came into being and how it functions. Section IV
discusses the specific allegations of copyright infringement made against
Napster by the RIAA. Section V provides a brief overview of copyright
law, various forms of copyright infringement, and how copyright law has
been adapted to the new challenges posed by the Internet. Section VI
then considers the legal merit of the RIAA's allegations. Section VII discusses the implications of technological change for the music industry,
and Section VIII offers a brief conclusion.
II.

MUSIC AND THE INTERNET

Until just a few years ago, a music lover on a tight budget generally
had to sacrifice sound quality. Unless he was willing to listen only to
what was on the radio at that moment, he was relegated to listening to
relatively inexpensive records or cassettes, analog-based mediums that
deteriorate with each subsequent playback. For those demanding the
high sound quality and longevity of digitally recorded music, and willing
to pay for it, CDs were the medium of choice.
Though the prices of CDs have remained high over time, 6 the price
of computer technology has decreased steadily over the past decade. As a
result, today about 60 million American households own personal computers and 43 million households have Internet access. 7 With such widespread access to digitally-based information combined with the
increasing use of computers for entertainment, it was only a matter of
time before music began to be transmitted through cyberspace.
The transmission of music over the Internet began in earnest with
the introduction of the World Wide Web and the browser in the early
nineties, but was initially hampered by slow transmission speeds. 8
Downloading a five-minute song could easily take several hours given
the characteristics of telephone lines, which limited most Internet connections to a speed of 56,000 bauds per second (56K).
Eventually, the MP3 compression algorithm was developed, 9 and it
6. See Retailer Profile, National Ass'n of Recording Merchants (visited Apr. 27, 2000)
<http'/www.narm.com/programs/research.htm> (providing data for the average dollar sale
of audio products, primarily CDs, relative to the number of items purchased, for the period
1992 through 1998).
7. See Katherine Yung, America Joins Trend: Home PCs, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Mar. 2, 2000, at 1A, available in 2000 WL 14657422.
8. See Hamish McRae, The Markets May be Mad, But They May Also be Profoundly
Wise, THE INDEP. - LONDON, Mar. 9, 2000, at 4, available in 2000 WL 6464248.
9. See MP3 Site Ties Up With Local Record Company, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER,
Apr. 3, 2000 at 7. MP3 is the acronym for Moving Picture Experts Group 1, Audio Layer 3.
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is now the most popular format for downloading music. 10 The widespread use of MP3 files stems from the fact that they are highly compressed yet provide near-CD sound quality." Transmission of MP3 files
over the Internet is substantially quicker than it is with older, spaceconsuming formats such as WAV. Furthermore, as with any digital format, MP3 files can be copied and distributed an unlimited number of
times without degrading their sound quality. But despite the ease of
transmitting an MP3 file, the tough part has been to locate specific ones
in the vastness of cyberspace-at least until now.
III.

THE BIRTH OF NAPSTER

In early 1999, Shawn Fanning, a nineteen-year-old freshman computer
science student at Northeastern University, wanted to make it easier for
his roommate to find MP3 files over the Internet. 12 Finding a specific
MP3 file, then as now, is generally a tedious process. Using a search
engine such as Lycos or Yahoo, a person obtains a list of websites supposedly containing the desired file, and then enters each site individually to
determine if it contains a downloadable copy. Often the web link provided by the browser is invalid due to the website being closed or temporarily off-line (i.e., a "dead link"). Occasionally the web link is a ruse
designed to direct people to lewd material. Other times, an appropriate
web site may be found, but the files it contains are disorganized or are
transmitted slowly. An alternative to using a search engine is to find
someone willing to send the desired file via e-mail.1 3 Either approach is
time-consuming.
Fanning's solution was simple, yet elegant: enable people to share
MP3 files on their hard drives directly with one another with the assistance of a centralized database of titles combined with software that converts each user's computer into a server. Based on this conceptual
breakthrough, in a matter of months Fanning had developed a system he
10. See Julian Dibbell, The Record Industry's Digital Daze, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 26,
1998, at 106, available in 1998 WL 27734514 (estimating 5 million users worldwide).
11. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., No. 99-5183 (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 6, 1999), at
para. 41. MP3 files take up only one-twelfth the space of a typical music file; see also Telephone Interview with Konstantin Liiufer, PhD, Associate Professor of Computer Science,
Loyola University - Chicago (Mar. 16, 2000). The compactness of an MP3 file is achieved by
removing inaudible elements and then algorithmically compressing what remains. The
perceived frequency response and signal-to-noise ratios are retained. Id. This is known as
"lossy" compression. Id.
12. See Harmon, supra note 5, at Al.
13. See id. This can entail persuading the provider, if he does not already have the
desired song on his hard drive, to "rip" (i.e., convert) the music from a CD into a file on his
hard drive before he can e-mail it. Id. The ripping software is freely available over the
Internet. Id.
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named Napster. 14 The software component of the system, MusicShare,
enables a user to connect to a database located at the Napster website
and tell it which MP3 files he is willing to share with other Napster
users. The names of these MP3 files as well as the Internet Protocol (IP)
address for each "Host" user are then stored in Napster's central
database. This list is continually updated as Hosts log on or off.1 5 The
files themselves are never stored on Napster's servers.
Any Napster user can connect to this central database to search for a
specific title. Within a few seconds the user is told whether there are any
Hosts offering this title, the different recording qualities ("bitrates") that
are available, the file sizes, and each Host's line speed. The user specifies from which Host he wishes to download the MP3 file. A message is
then transmitted through Napster's servers to the appropriate Host,
which assumes the role of server and immediately begins transferring
the file directly to the user through each party's respective ISP. 1 6 From
this point forward, Napster's website is out of the picture. 17 This process
is depicted in the diagram below.

Napster Operating Model
Napster.com
MP3 Mast. List
(A hasfiIes
7,8,9)
(B has files 1, 2, 3)

Internet
------- 9Service
Provider
hasfil 97

SWho

User A ..

& G .......

...

-----------

User B

------------------------------

4-ltfl
------------------

------------------------------------

f.,

-

-

se,fi9

---------------------

14. See Warren Cohen, Napster is Rocking the Music Industry, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD
Mar. 6, 2000, at 41, available in 2000 WL 7717576 (explaining that "Napster" was the
nickname given to Mr. Fanning when he let his closely cropped hair grow a bit shaggy).
15. See Pl.'s Mem. of P. & A. . in Opp'n. to Def. Napster,Inc.'s Mot. for Summ. Adj. on
the Applicability of the 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) Safe HarborAffirmative Defense (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(No. C99-5183), at 10 [hereinafter Pl.'s Opp'n to Napster's Mot. for Summ. Adj.].
16. See Telephone Interview with Sean Parker, Product Development, Napster, Inc.
(Mar. 23, 2000) [hereinafter Parker Interview].
17. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., No. 99-5183 (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 6, 1999), at
para. 50. At the time the RIAA filed its lawsuit, Napster stayed involved in the entire
download process to ensure that file transmission was completed successfully. Id. If a
download was interrupted because, for example, the user offering the file had logged off,
Napster would automatically locate the same recording from another Napster user and
resume the download at the point it was interrupted. Id. This feature was disabled in
January 2000. Id.
REP.,
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Napster thus functions as a community of MP3 listeners. Though
most Napster users are willing to share their MP3 files, any Napster
user can deny access to his files while retaining the ability to download
from other users.1 8 A major advantage of Napster over traditional
search engines is that by specializing in MP3 files, and by possessing a
continually updated database of file names, it is nearly certain that a
user seeking a specific file will be able to successfully transfer it if it is
listed in the Napster database. 19
Realizing that his system had enormous commercial potential, Fanning incorporated Napster in May 1999 and made his software freely
available to the public that August.20 Currently, the company is operating on venture capital, but it may obtain its future revenue from adver21
tising, subscriber fees, or marketing arrangements with record labels.
Napster's most valuable product may ultimately turn out to be the data
it could collect on consumers' musical tastes and listening habits, data
22
which could then be sold to music marketers.
Napster has taken the Internet by storm. As of early April 2000,
there were over 5 million registered Napster users, 2 3 many of whom regularly transfer MP3 files onto their hard drives at no cost. News of Napster has spread by word of mouth, and as more people have gained access
to the system, the number of MP3 files available through Napster has
grown exponentially. 24 In November 1999, a person who connected to
Napster could obtain anywhere from 60,000 to 100,000 MP3 files, depending on the number of users connected at that moment. By
June 2000, the average number of available MP3 files had grown to
about 600,000.25 These MP3 files consist primarily of modern rock, but
18. See Telephone Interview with David Weekly, Computer Scientist at Stanford University (Mar. 12, 2000) [hereinafter Weekly Interview]. Some users decline to share their
files with others in the apparently unfounded fear that outside entry would compromise the
security of their system, even for the limited purpose of copying MP3 files; See Parker Interview, supra note 17. Others might be unwilling to share files because the process of
uploading files to other users slows down the process of downloading files to one's own
computer due to the consumption of bandwidth. Id.
19. See Cohen, supra note 14, at 41.
20. See Telephone Interview with Lyn Jensen, CFO, Napster, Inc. (Mar. 17, 2000)
[hereinafter Jensen Interview].
21. See Parker Interview, supra note 16.
22. See Harmon, supra note 5.
23. See Mike Musgrove and Robert Thomason, Napster Shares Files, Raises Ire, WASH.
POST, Apr. 7, 2000, at El, available in 2000 WL 2295459.
24. See id.
25. See Parker Interview, supra note 16. Many of these files are duplicates-identical
ones available from more than one Napster user. Id. For example, a search for Copeland's
Appalachian Spring might yield 15 potential sources. One would then choose from whom
to download based on the speed of the source's modem and the sound quality of his recording. However, the aforementioned 600,000 figure was from only one server of which there
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files are also available in genres such as classical, opera, country, comedy, and anything else other Napster users are willing to share. Among
college students, Napster has spread so quickly that "the resulting glut
of digital traffic has overloaded university networks. Dozens of colleges,
including New York University and the University of California at
Berkeley, have banned students from using the service." 26 Indiana University blocked student access to Napster after it realized that Napster
27
use was consuming nearly 60% of the available bandwidth.
IV.

RIAA'S LAWSUIT AGAINST NAPSTER

On December 9, 1999, eighteen music companies filed suit in the U.S.
District Court for Northern California with the RIAA's assistance, alleging that Napster is engaging in contributory copyright infringement and
is also vicariously liable for direct copyright infringement by its users. 28
The RIAA reasons:
Plaintiffs and their recording artists are compensated for their creative
efforts and monetary investments largely from the sale of phonorecords
to the public and from license fees from the reproduction, distribution,
digital performance, or other exploitation of such phonorecords. Absent
such compensation, profits and motivation are siphoned away from artists and the record companies that record, manufacture, promote, and
distribute those works. The pool of resources available for finding and
promoting new artists shrinks, and sound quality and recording integrity are diluted and corrupted. The ultimate result is that the public's
access to a wide variety of high-quality musical recordings is sharply
29
curtailed.
Claiming that on average 90% of recordings available through Napster infringe copyrights held by its members' labels, the RIAA is seeking
statutory damages of $100,000 for each copyright-protected song exchanged using Napster. 30 The total amount of damages sought exceeds
31
$100 million and if awarded would put Napster out of business.
are a total of 150. These servers are currently not connected and are assigned to users
randomly during each session. However, there are plans for linking them, and once this
occurs the number of files simultaneously available to an individual user will increase substantially. See <httpJ/www.napigator.com>. A user can connect to a website that enables
him to select a specific Napster server. Id.
26. See Harmon, supra note 5. See also David Weekly, How to Access Napster When It's
Blocked (visited Apr. 27, 2000) <http://www.david.weekly.org/code/napster-proxy.php3>
(noting that this blockage can easily be bypassed by selecting a proxy server).
27. See Amy Kover, Who's Afraid of This Kid? The Recording Industry, That's Who.,
FORTUNE MAG., Mar. 20, 2000, at 129, available in 2000 WL 3461856.
28. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., No. 99-5183 (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 6, 1999).
29. Id. para. 30.
30. See Clark, supra note 2.
31. See id.
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Though the exact amount of damages is debatable, there are indications that widespread use of Napster has the potential to reduce record
sales.3 2 A reporter quoted one young woman as saying "I love Napster.
I'm never buying a CD again."3 3 In one of the more egregious examples
of copyright infringement, Madonna's remake of American Pie appeared
on Napster several weeks before it was even released by the record companies, courtesy of someone who transferred (i.e., "ripped")34 a copy of an
advance-promotion CD to his hard drive, and then made it available to
other Napster users. 35 Sean "Puffy" Combs' album, Born Again, was also
36
available on Napster prior to its public release, infuriating Mr. Combs.
V. COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE

A. BACKGROUND
Copyright law was first developed in the late middle ages in response to the invention of the printing press.3 7 Its goal has always been
to balance society's interest in access to information against the right of
the information's creators to profit from the fruits of their labor.3 8 In
this country, copyright law was established by Congress pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which states that "Congress shall
have power... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
39
to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
The statutory framework for copyright law is set out in
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101,4 0 and gives a copyright holder the exclusive
rights to reproduce, distribute, perform, prepare derivative works, and
display the copyrighted work. 4 1 In simplified terms, "a copyright for a
musical work created on or after January 1, 1978, subsists from its creation and ... endures for a term consisting of the life of the author plus
70 years following the author's death."42 Copyrights "subsisting on January 1, 1978 ...endure for 28 years from the date [the copyright] was
originally secured, [and can be renewed for a] further term of
32. See Kover, supra note 27, at 129.
33. See id.
34. See Harmon, supra notes 5, 13, at Al and accompanying text.
35. See Cohen, supra note 14.
36. See Sherman Fridman, Napster Operates a Pirate Bazaar - RIAA, NEWSBYTES
NEWS NETWORK, Dec. 10, 1999, available in 1999 WL 29943883.
37. See Kevin Davis, Fair Use on the Internet: A Fine Line Between Fair and Foul,
34 U.S.F. L. REV. 129, 132 (1999).
38. See id. at 132 n.14.
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
40. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (2000).
41. See Davis, supra note 37, at 134; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000)
42. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
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67 years."
"Copyright infringement occurs when an individual uses, or authorizes the use of, the copyrighted material [without prior permission and]
in a way that trespasses into any of the copyright holder's exclusive
rights. " 44 "Copyright law imposes 'absolute liability' for [infringement,
which means that] the copyright owner can [obtain] both injunctive relief
...and monetary damages... whether the person violating the rights
did so intentionally or by accident." 45 It is the copyright owner's burden
46
to prove copyright infringement.

B.
1.

BAsIc FoRms

OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

Direct Liability

An individual is directly liable for copyright infringement if he has
copied material protected by a valid copyright. 47 It is the copyright
owner's burden to prove this, though he does not need to prove the defendant's intent or knowledge of the infringement. 48 However, there are
two major exceptions to direct copyright infringement, the common law
Fair Use Doctrine and the Audio Home Recording Act ("AHRA").
Under the Fair Use Doctrine, a defendant may escape liability if he
can prove that his use was reasonable based on: (1) the purpose and
49
character of the use (i.e., the more commercial it is, the less fair);
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work (i.e., the more creative it is and
the less informational, the less fair);50 (3) the amount and substantiality
of the portion used;5 1 and (4) the effect of unrestricted and widespread
conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant on the plaintiffs potential market for the work. 5 2 All of these factors must be considered, with
43. See id. § 304(a)(1)-(2).
44. See Davis, supra note 37, at 134-35.
45. See Mark Radcliffe, Digital Millenium CopyrightAct Forgingthe Copyright Framework for the Internet: First Steps, PR~c. L. INST., 557 PLI/Pat 365, 370 (1999).
46. See Jennifer E. Markiewicz, Seeking Shelter from the MP3 Storm: How FarDoes
the DigitalMillennium Copyright Act Online Service Provider Liability Limitation Reach?,
7 COMM. LAw CONSPECTUS 423, 427 (1999).
47. See Donna M. Lampert et al., Overview of Internet Legal and Regulatory Issues,
PRAc. L. INST., 544 PLI/Pat 179, 223 (1998).

48. See Markiewicz, supra note 46, at 427.
49. See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 24 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), affd, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. dismissed, 516 U.S. 1005 (1995).
50. See Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985); see
also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
51. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 450 n.30 (1984)
(copying an entire work ordinarily militates against a finding of fair use). Id. at 449-50; see
also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
52. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994); see 17 U.S.C. § 107
(2000).

20001

RIAA v. NAPSTER

53
the fourth given the most weight.
Congress's passage in 1992 of the AHRA lent more definition to the
Fair Use Doctrine. 54 Under the AHRA, no lawsuit may be brought "alleging infringement of copyright based on the... noncommercial use by
a consumer of [a digital audio recording device or medium] for making
digital or analog musical recordings." 55 This resolved the prior uncer56
tainty regarding the legal ramifications of home taping.

2.

Contributory Liability

Contributory copyright liability "originates in tort law and stems from
the notion that one who directly contributes to another's infringement
should be held accountable." 57 A party is contributorily liable, and thus
subject to monetary5s damages and injunctive 59 relief,60 if it has knowledge (or reason to know) of the infringing conduct of another, and induced, caused, or materially contributed to this conduct. 6 1 Participation
62
by the defendant need not be "substantial."
"Contributory infringement . . .is of two types - personal conduct
that forms part of or furthers the infringement and contribution of machinery or goods that provide the means to infringe." 6 3 In the absence of
a physical product that is the subject of the alleged infringement, "the
extent of control exercised by the defendant over the third party's means
of infringement" is considered. 64 The greater the degree of control, the
greater the likelihood that contributory infringement will be found.
In Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, Inc., swap meet operators were held
contributorily liable for the infringing activities of vendors who were selling copyrighted music recordings without permission. 6 5 The direct liability of the operators having been established, the court needed to
determine whether the operators' participation level was enough to war53. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 935 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
54. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000).
55. See id.
56. See John W. Hazard, Jr., COPYRIGHT LAW IN BusiNEss AND PRACTICE § 8.03, n.269
(Rev. ed. 1999).
57. Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
58. David Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.02(A) 14-8, (1999), available in LEXIS
(Copyright Law, Treatises & Analytical Materials, Matthew-Bender).
59. See id.at § 14.06(C) 14-123.
60. See Markiewicz, supra note 46, at 433; see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 502 -505 (2000).
61. See Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
62. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264.
63. See Nimmer, supra note 58, § 12.04(A)(2).
64. Lockheed Martin v. Network Solutions, 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1999)
65. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 259, 264 (1996).
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rant contributory infringement. 6 6 According to the Ninth Circuit, providing the site and facilities where the provider knew infringing activity
was occurring was sufficient to create contributory liability. 67 Though
this case did not involve the Internet, it has influenced the legal analysis
68
of contributory liability in cyberspace.
3.

Vicarious Liability

A party is vicariously liable for copyright infringement when it has the
authority to supervise a direct infringer's actions; has induced, caused,
or materially contributed to the infringing activity; 6 9 and has a direct
financial benefit from the infringing activity. 70 Unlike contributory infringement, vicarious liability may be imposed even if a defendant has no
direct knowledge of the infringing activity. Courts developed the concept
of vicarious liability in an effort to "fashion a principle for enforcing copyrights against a defendant whose economic interests were intertwined
with the direct infringer's, but who did not actually employ the direct
infringer."7 1 As with contributory infringement, remedies for vicarious
72
liability include both monetary damages and injunctive relief.
An example of someone who would be held vicariously liable is a
nightclub owner who sells more tickets when a band illegally performs
copyrighted music in his nightclub. "If the band has fail[ed] to obtain a
public performance license for" the songs it plays, it is liable for direct
infringement of the music composition owner's copyright. 73 The nightclub owner, in turn, is vicariously liable because he benefits financially
through increased attendance at his nightclub because he has the ability
74
to control the band.
Another example of vicarious liability is what was done by Cherry
Auction. The Fonovisa court found Cherry Auction to be vicariously liable in addition to having engaged in contributory infringement because it
"promoted the swap meet and controlled the access of customers to the
swap meet area."7 5 Furthermore, Cherry Auction derived "substantial
financial benefits from admission fees, concession stand sales and park66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See Timothy L. Skelton, Internet Copyright Infringement and Service Providers:
The Case for a Negotiated Rulemaking Alternative, 35 SAN DIEGO L.REv. 219, 252 (1998).
69. See Markiewicz, supra note 46, at 427.
70. See id.
71. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262 (discussing the landmark vicarious liability case of Shapiro, Bernstein and Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963)).
72. See Markiewicz, supra note 46, at 433; see generally Nimmer, supra note 59,
§ 12.04(A)(2).
73. See Radcliffe, supra note 45, at 371.
74. See id.
75. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262.
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ing fees, all of which flow directly from customers who want to buy the
76
counterfeit recordings at bargain basement prices."
C.

ONLINE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT LIABILITY LIMITATION ACT

(TITLE II)
Continued expansion of the Internet brought ISPs increasingly into
conflict with copyright holders. Unless copyright law was modernized,
growth of the Internet would be hampered because ISPs could not constantly police the huge amount of information that is stored or passes
through their networks. In response to this situation, in 1998 Congress
passed the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act,
which was incorporated as Title II of the Digital Millenium Copyright
Act (DMCA).77 David Nimmer has written that ". . .by limiting the liability of service providers, the DMCA ensures that the efficiency of the
Internet will continue to improve and that the variety and quality of
78
services on the Internet will continue to expand."
Title II retains the traditional elements required to prove copyright
infringement.7 9 However, an ISP found to be contributorily or vicariously liable for copyright infringement can avoid monetary penalties8
and will not have its operations shut down 8l if it can prove that its activities are protected under Title 11.82 The only penalty that can be imposed on such an ISP is a narrow injunction to block access to individual
infringing users.8 3 As noted in Napster's Motion for Summary Adjudication, "[t]his is consistent with the DMCA's allocation of responsibilities to
individual users not to infringe.. ."84 In determining whether or not to
impose an injunction, the court must weigh the financial burden of the
ISP against the harm suffered by the copyright owner if no action is
taken to remove the infringing material or activity.8 5 An ISP proves that
it merits Title II limited liability protection by demonstrating that it is,
in fact, an ISP as defined by the statute, and also that it engages in at
least one of four protected functions.
76. Id. at 263.
77. See Markiewicz, supra note 46, at 424. See also Radcliffe, supra note 45, at 367.
The DMCA, Pub. L. No. 105-304, was signed into law on October 28, 1998.
78. See Nimmer, supra note 58, at § 12B.01 Cl.
79. See Markiewicz, supra note 46, at 424.
80. See Radcliffe, supra note 45, at 373.
81. See Def Napster,Inc.'s Notice ofMot. and Mot. for Summ. Adj.; Mem. ofP. & A. . in
Supp. Thereof (N.D. Cal. 2000) (No. C99-5183), at 22 [hereinafter Napster's Mot. for Summ.

Adj.].
82.
83.
84.
85.

See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1 (1998), available in 1998 WL 261605, at *67.
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(1)(B) (2000).
Napster's Mot. for Summ. Adj., supra note 81, at 22.
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(2)(A)-(D) (2000).
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Title II Internet Service ProviderStatus

As a practical matter, any Internet-based entity that facilitates access
to the Internet and its various resources is considered an ISP.86 More
formally, an ISP is any entity that transmits, routes, or provides "connections for digital online communications, between or among points
specified by a user, of material of the user's choosing, without modifying
the content of the material as sent or received."8 7 An entity that provides online services or network access would be considered an ISP if it
temporarily stores information on its servers (System Caching), allows
users to store information on its servers (User Storage), or provides links
to information (Information Location Tool).8 8
2.

Title II Functional Safe Harbors

a.

Transitory DigitalNetwork Communications (Conduit)

Limited liability is granted to ISPs that route or provide connections
for information through their system and which is stored there only for
as long as it takes to route the information to its next destination. Additional requirements are:
(1) the transmission of the material is initiated by or at the direction of
a person other than the ISP; (2) the ISP does not select the information
and the routing and storage processes are automatic; (3) the ISP does
not select the recipients of the material except as an automatic response
to the request of another person; (4) any copies of the material made by
the ISP during the course of any transient storage are accessible only to
the anticipated recipients and are maintained on the ISP's system only
for as long as is necessary to complete the transmission; and (5) the
information is transmitted through the ISP's system without
89
modification.
Congress refers to transitory digital communications networks meeting
these requirements as "conduits."90
b.

System Caching

Limited liability is granted to ISPs that temporarily store material on
their servers in order to provide quick and easy access by their users. 9 1
Information is sometimes briefly stored on an ISP's system in order to
"facilitate access by users subsequent to the one who previously sought
access to it." 9 2 In order to qualify for this form of limited liability, ISPs
86. See Radcliffe, supra note 45, at 376.
87. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A)(2000).

88. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B).
89. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(l)-(5).
90. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2 (1998), available in 1998 WL 414916, at *131.

91. 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(1)-(2) (2000).
92. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2 (1998), available in 1998 WL 414916, at *131.
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providing System Caching must subject their users to the same conditions of access (e.g., fees, passwords) as the originating site would have
93
imposed.
c.

Information Residing on Systems at Direction of Users (User
Storage)

Limited liability is granted to an ISP that stores copyright infringing
material on its system at the behest of a third party, as long as the ISP
(1) does not have actual knowledge or awareness that the material is
infringing; (2) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the information; (3) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity;
and (4) upon receiving notification of the infringing activity or information, responds expeditiously to remove or disable access to the relevant
94
material.
In order to qualify for this status, the ISP must also have a Designated
95
Agent to receive notifications of alleged infringements.
d.

Linking to Infringing Material Via Information Location Tools

Information location tools are essential to the operation of the Internet
because without them, users would not be able to find the information
they need. 96 In an effort to promote their development, a limited liability safe harbor was thus created for ISPs that link users to online locations through directories, indexes, references, pointers, or hypertext
97
links.
Limited liability is granted even if the online locations contain infringing material or activity, as long as the ISP
(1) does not have actual knowledge of infringement at the other online
location nor awareness of facts and circumstances from which infringing activity in that location is apparent; and (2) upon obtaining such
knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access
to, the material. 98 [Furthermore, the ISP must not] (1) receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in
which the ISP has the right and ability to control such activity, and (2)
upon notification of claimed infringement to a Designated Copyright
Agent, [must respond] expeditiously to remove or disable access to the
material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infring93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
(1999).
98.

17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(1)-(2) (2000).
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1).
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2).
See Nimmer, supra note 58, at § 12B.05, Al.
See Jeffrey P. Cunard et al., Internet Law, PRAc. L.
17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1)(C) (2000).

INST.,

581 PLI/Pat 853, 870
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ing activity.9 9
This portion of the statute is vague with regard to the knowledge
component. On the one hand, an ISP engaged in information location
has no obligation to proactively seek out copyright infringement by its
users.10 0 Title II states that an ISP is not required to engage in "monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity.. ." in order to obtain safe harbor protection. 01 ' Furthermore, an
ISP will not lose liability protection if it becomes aware of material that
is only "suspect," and not "obvious[ly]" infringing. 10 2 On the other hand,
the analysis provided by the House Committee on the Judiciary states
that an ISP will not qualify for liability limitation if it ignores "red flags"
of blatant infringement. 10 3 It is unclear how blatant the infringement
must be before the ISP is held to be ignoring a "red flag."
VI.
A.

NAPSTER'S LEGAL LIABILITY

DIRECT COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT BY NAPSTER'S USERS

Arguments can be made on both sides of the issue of whether Napster's users are engaging in direct copyright infringement when they
download or share copyrighted music. Many Napster supporters believe
that enough elements of the Fair Use defense exist to exempt Napster
users from direct liability. They argue that the use of Napster is not
commercial because Napster users, typically young people on a budget,
would not buy the songs in a record store anyway. With no economic loss
to the record companies, the use of Napster cannot be considered commercial. Others argue that using Napster to download MP3 files actually helps the music industry by stimulating the purchase of CDs, the
result of people having had the opportunity to sample artists with whom
they might not otherwise be familiar. This argument is supported by the
fact that "in 1999, the first year in which MP3 technology was widely
available, the record industry experienced 8% growth in revenue....- 0o
For the purposes of assessing Napster's contributory and vicarious
liability, this paper will assume that those who use Napster to transfer
copyrighted music files are engaging in direct copyright infringement.
Such users would not be able to invoke the Fair Use Doctrine as a defense because under the four-step analysis discussed above, (1) Napster
99. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(2)-(3).
100. See Markiewicz, supra note 46, at 438.
101. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1) (2000).
102. See Markiewicz, supra note 46, at 438.
103. See id.
104. Brian Ploskina, Record Industry Shoots Itself with MP3 Bullet, INTERACTwE WEEK
FROM ZDWIRE, Apr. 17, 2000, available in 2000 WL 4065877 (citing statistics provided by
the RIAA).
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users typically download MP3 files to avoid paying for them in record
stores' 0 5 and are rarely just making a backup copy or copying a single
song for a friend; (2) the copyrighted works are for uses that are more
creative than informational, which weighs against a finding of fair
use; 10 6 (3) the entire copyrighted music files are typically downloaded to
users' hard drives; and (4) the effect on the music industry is to reduce
07
the potential market for the work.'
Many readers will be relieved to learn that the RIAA has stated that
it does not plan to prosecute Napster users for direct copyright infringement,' 0 8 which is a federal crime punishable by up to three years in
prison and $250,000 in fines.' 0 9 The RIAA recognizes that such a move
could induce retaliatory consumer boycotts of legitimate music
purchases, and as such would not be a good marketing strategy. Nevertheless, given that the direct infringement exists, the RIAA is still able to
press a claim against those it alleges to be contributorily and vicariously
liable.
B.

ASSESSMENT OF NAPSTER'S CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY

The RIAA has accused Napster of contributory copyright infringement, and will therefore need to show that Napster knowingly induces,
causes, or materially contributes to infringing activities by its users. It
is unlikely that the RIAA will be able to demonstrate that Napster induced or caused copyright infringement. The terms "induce" and "cause"
indicate the defendant's initiation of infringing activity, yet Napster is a
passive system that merely responds to its users' queries. Users, not
Napster, initiate the transfer of MP3 files. Furthermore, Napster does
nothing to encourage its users to make even non-copyrighted MP3 files
available for uploading, let alone copyrighted ones. As previously mentioned, a user can download files even if he is not willing to share his own
files with others.
It will be harder for Napster to refute allegations that it materially
contributed to copyright infringement by some of its users. Though the
term "material contribution" has not yet been defined by courts in the
online context, it can plausibly be argued that without Napster, people
would find it much more difficult to locate and download copyrighted ma105. See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 14-16 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), affd, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. dismissed, 516 U.S. 1005 (1995). No fair use
was found where scientists photocopied publication in order to avoid cost of purchasing
additional copies from publisher. Id.
106. See Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985).
107. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
108. See Harmon, supra note 5, at Al.
109. See Chad Swiatecki, Michigan State U.: Stiff Fines, Jail Not Deterring Napster
Users, U-WinE,Apr. 14, 2000, available in 2000 WL 19350225.
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terial. By this reasoning, Napster greatly facilitates, and therefore materially contributes to, copyright infringing activity.
Even if the RIAA can convince the court that Napster materially
contributes to its users' infringing activity, it will be difficult to prove
that Napster had knowledge of this infringing activity. First, ISPs are
under no affirmative obligation to seek out copyright infringing activity
on their systems. 1 10 Second, Napster has much less reason to be aware
of the activities of its registrants than did Cherry Auction, the swap meet
operator in Fonovisa. Whereas the swap meet operator and its registrants shared the same physical space, Napster and its registrants have
no physical contact following the initial registration, though they do have
a minimal degree of contact in cyberspace. 1 1i Third, knowledge of infringing activity cannot be presumed where a legitimate use for a device
or system exists. Several reported decisions involving similar facts support this conclusion.
In Sony v. Universal, 464 U.S. 417 (1984), the movie industry tried
to prevent the Sony Corporation from selling its Betamax Video Cassette
Recorder (VCR) on the grounds that it had constructive knowledge that
i 2
the VCR was being used to make illegal copies of copyrighted films."
Ruling in favor of Sony, the Court stated that ". . . the sale of copying
equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of
substantial noninfringing uses"1 3 such as time-shifting (recording a television program for later viewing). As with the VCR, Napster is capable
of being used for the legitimate purpose of listening to and sharing noncopyrighted material, which the RIAA itself acknowledges exists on the
14
Internet.
The District Court for the Central District of California was faced
with a situation similar to Sony in 1998, when the RIAA sought an injunction against Diamond Multimedia to stop impending distribution of
its Rio PMP 300 ("Rio")." i 5 The Rio is a handheld device that can receive
MP3 files from a computer's hard drive, store up to two hours of music,
110. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (2000) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to condition the applicability of subsections (a) through (d) on. . . (1) a service provider monitoring
its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity. . ").
111. This applies the reasoning used in Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v.
Network Solutions, 45 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1463, 1467 (C.D. Cal. 1997), available in 1997 WL
829341.
112. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
113. Id. at 442.
114. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., No. 99-5183 (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 6, 1999), at
para. 43.
115. See Recording Indus. Assoc. of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 29 F. Supp. 2d
624, at 635 (C.D. Cal. 1998), affd, 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
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and then play this music back.' 1 6 As such, this device functions as a
"space-shifter" in that one can listen to music while away from one's computer. The RIAA argued that the Rio can be used to make serial digital
copies of music (i.e., copies of copies) because although it does not have
digital audio output capability, its memory card can be transferred to
any other Rio."17 As such, the Rio should be considered a recording device, 1 8s which is defined by the AHRA to be:
..any machine or device of a type commonly distributed to individuals
for use by individuals, whether or not included with or as part of some
other machine or device, the digital recording function of which is
designed or marketed for the primary purpose of, and that
is capable of,
119
making a digital audio copied recording for private use.
As a recording device, the Rio would be subject to the AHRA's stringent provisions for such devices. This would require Diamond to make a
2% royalty payment on sales to the Register of Copyrights at the Library
of Congress, for ultimate redistribution to the appropriate copyright
holders. 120 More importantly, Diamond would have to modify the Rio by
adding Serial Copy Management System (SCMS) technology to prevent
121
it from making serial digital copies.
The court held that although the Rio is capable of serial copying, the
AHRA does not directly prohibit such copying. 12 2 In any event, "because
the Rio itself has no digital output capability, and the removable flash
memory cards cannot be copied by another Rio device," the Rio adequately prohibits unauthorized serial copying and is not subject to the
additional burden of having to incorporate SCMS technology. 12 3 Finally,
the court stated that even if the Rio were considered a recording device,
no injunction could have been issued against it because it can be used to
record "legitimate music" and is "a device with significant beneficial
uses." 1 24 This last point is directly applicable to Napster, which can be
used for the legitimate purpose of sharing non-copyrighted music.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See Dibbell, supra note 10 at 106.
119. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3) (2000).
120. See Dibbell, supra note 10; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2000); see also 17 U.S.C.
§ 1004(a)(1) (2000).
121. See Dibbell, supra note 10. See also Hazard, supra note 56. SCMS encodes digital
information onto any first-generation copy of a digital musical recording (digital information not contained in the factory original). Id. The newly encoded information distinguishes between the factory original and the subsequently created first-generation copy in
order to prohibit future digital copying from that first-generation copy, while continuing to
permit unlimited copying from the factory original. Id.
122. See Recording Indus. Assoc. of Am., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 631.
123. See id. at 632.
124. See id. at 633.
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The final consideration when dealing with an allegation of contributory liability in the absence of a physical product is "the extent of control
exercised by the defendant over the third party's means of infringement." 12 5 In Fonovisa, the court viewed Cherry Auction as having "direct control over the activity that the third-party alleged infringers
engaged in on the premises" because it had licensed real estate to those
alleged infringers. 126 Renting space, even at a flea market, creates a
legal duty by the landlord to control illegal activities on his premises. 127
Napster, on the other hand, bears more similarity to the defendant in
Lockheed Martin v. Network Solutions, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999). In
that case, the court held that Network Solutions, a provider of Internet
domain names, had little control over potential copyright infringers
given that its function was more akin to the Postal Service "performing
128
the routine service of routing mail."
C.

ASSESSMENT OF NAPSTER'S VicARIous LIABILITY

Napster would be vicariously liable if it has the authority to supervise its users' actions; induces, causes, or materially contributes to infringing activity by its users; 12 9 and has a direct financial benefit from
its users' infringing activity. 130 Napster would not need to have direct
knowledge of directly infringing activity by its users in order to be held
vicariously liable.
Napster does not supervise its users' actions after they obtain the
initial linking information from Napster's servers. MP3 file transfers occur directly from user to user with no involvement by Napster. Indeed,
Napster only controls its users' access to its system if it wants to remove
them for engaging in copyright infringing activity. This stands in contrast to Cherry Auction, which actively controlled access of its customers
to the swap meet area. 13 1 Though Napster used to provide an "Auto Resume" feature by which its system would automatically transmit new
links to help complete any interrupted MP3 downloads, the company terminated this service in January 2000.132
As discussed above, Napster is a passive system that reacts to its
users' queries and therefore does not induce or cause its users to violate
125. Lockheed Martin v. Network Solutions, 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1999).
126. Id. at 985 (citing Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir.
1996)).
127. See id. at 984 (citing Hard Rock Cafe Licensing v. Concession Servs., 955 F.2d
1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992)).

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
See Markiewicz, supra note 46, at 427.
Id.
See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262.
Pl.'s Opp'n to Napster's Mot. for Summ. Adj., supra note 15, at 13.
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copyright laws. Unlike Cherry Auction, Napster does not promote its
service through advertising. Napster users learn about the service
through word of mouth or by reading about it in the press.
Napster would probably have to concede that it has materially contributed to direct copyright infringement by its users. Without Napster,
people would find it much more difficult to locate and download copyrighted material. Napster greatly facilitates, and thereby materially
contributes, to copyright infringing activity.
It is unlikely that the Ninth Circuit will determine that Napster receives a direct financial benefit from any infringing activity by its users.
Courts have dismissed "[tiheories alleging that infringing activity enhances the value of an ISP's service, thus attracting more subscribers. . ."-133 Napster does not presently charge an admission fee from its
users or receive advertising revenue, and is instead financed solely from
venture capital. 134 Even if it did charge an admission fee or obtain advertising revenue, it is unlikely that the RIAA could prove that the value
of Napster's service "lies in providing access to infringing material," 135
given that Napster is highly useful even when used solely for the purpose
of sharing non-copyrighted material. Furthermore, courts have held
that fixed fees in the online context negate any direct financial benefit
13 6
from alleged infringement.
Applying the various tests to assess vicarious liability, on balance it
appears that Napster cannot be held vicariously liable for any directly
infringing activity by its users. Though it is reasonable to conclude that
Napster materially contributes to those who decide to violate copyright
laws, Napster does not supervise its users' activities, nor does it induce
or cause them to engage in copyright violations. Furthermore, Napster
does not receive a direct financial benefit from any infringing activity by
its users.
D.

NAPSTER'S PROTECTED STATUS UNDER TITLE

II

Under the preceding analysis, Napster should not be held contributorily or vicariously liable for copyright infringement by its users. However, in the event that the reviewing court decides otherwise, it would
then have to determine if Napster is exempted from liability because it is
an ISP engaged in a protected function.
133. See Markiewicz, supra note 46, at 433.
134. See Parker Interview, supra note 16.
135. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1 (1998), available in 1998 WL 261605, at *66.
136. See, e.g., Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., 923 F. Supp.
1231, 1376-77 (N.D. Cal. 1995).

776
1.

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XVIII

Napster's Internet Service ProviderStatus

Napster is an ISP as defined in § 512(k)(1)(A) because it offers the
"transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications" and "provid[es] connections for digital online communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the
user's choosing, without modifying the content of the material as sent or
received." 13 7 Napster's system is comprised of 150 computer servers to
which Napster's users connect, proprietary MusicShare software that
users install on their computers, and proprietary software that Napster
runs on its own servers to control the process. The RIAA acknowledges
that "[t]hese components work in unison to form a fully integrated online
13 8
service."
2.

Napster's Protected FunctionStatus

a.

Napster as a Transitory Digital Communications Network

Napster argues that it should be classified as a § 512(a) Transitory
Digital Communications Network. 13 9 It may have chosen this category
because this would shield the company from a finding that it has knowledge of the infringing activity of its users.1 40 Napster argues that it falls
under § 512(a) because it merely routes information through its servers,
stores the information there only for as long as its users are online, and
meets the five-part test outlined in § 512(a)(1)-(5). 14 1 First, Napster
points out that the transmission of the Internet linking information is
initiated solely at the direction of a person other than Napster, satisfying
§ 512(a)(1). 142 Second, Napster maintains that it satisfies § 512(a)(2) because it does not select information to be transmitted. 143 Congress has
explained that the selection of information is demonstrated by exercising
editorial control in determining what material to send, something which
Napster does not do. 14 Furthermore, Napster's routing and storage
processes are automatic because its users are the ones who determine
what information they wish to share and download, as well as when this
is to occur. 145 Third, Napster argues that it does not select the recipients
of the material, who select themselves, and that it therefore meets
137. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A) (2000).
138. See Pl.'s Opp'n to Napster's Mot.for Summ. Adj., supra note 15, at 8.
139. See Def Napster, Inc.'s Reply Mer. of P. & A- in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. Adj.
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (No. C99-5183).
140. See Telephone Interview with Stanley Pierre-Louis, Attorney, Napster, Inc.
(Apr. 7, 2000) [hereinafter Pierre-Louis Interview].
141. See Napster's Mot. for Summ. Adj., supra note 81.
142. See id. at 11.
143. See id. at 12.
144. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2 (1998), available in 1998 WL 414916, at *131.
145. See Napster's Mot. for Summ. Adj., supra note 81, at 12.
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§ 512(a)(3). 14 6 Napster points out that the fourth and fifth requirements
are inapplicable to it. The fourth requirement, § 512(a)(4), is inapplicable because at no time are any copies of MP3 files stored or copied by
Napster's servers, given that "[aill files transfer directly from the com147
puter of one Napster user to the computer of the requesting user."
The fifth requirement, § 512(a)(5), is met because Napster does not mod148
ify any information passing through its servers.
The difficulty with classifying Napster under § 512(a) is that it is not
clear that Congress contemplated this provision to apply to systems that
route information links, and not the underlying information to which
these links refer. Congress referred to Transitory Digital Communications Networks as "conduits," suggesting that they route underlying in1 49
formation through their servers and not just links to this information.
However, the statute itself vaguely refers to the transmission of "material," without further elaboration. 150
As shall be seen, the RIAA believes that classification under the
more stringent § 512(d) Information Location Tool category is warranted, arguing that "Napster's entire motion is based on the flawed
premise that it can invoke the protections of 512(a) for all of its myriad
functions, as long as it can fit any of those functions into the narrow safe
harbor provided by 512(a)." 15 1 The RIAA points out that prior to the
lawsuit, the Napster website described the system as "a free information
52
location tool and integrated browser and communications service..."1
b. Napster as a Providerof System Caching
Napster is not a provider of system caching because it does not temporarily store user material on its servers. Only the titles of MP3s are
stored on Napster's servers. Both sides to the dispute agree that this
53
category does not apply to Napster.
c.

Napster as a Providerof User Storage

Napster does not store information for its users on its servers, and
therefore does not qualify for this type of protected status. Again, both
sides to the dispute agree that this category does not apply to
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
Summ.

See id.
Id. at 13.
See id.
See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2 (1998), available in 1998 WL 414916, at *131.
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2000).
Pl.s Opp'n to Napster's Mot. for Summ. Adj., supra note 15, at 1.
Id. at 3. Napster has since removed this statement from its website. Id.
See Pl.'s Opp'n to Napster's Mot. for Summ. Adj., supra note 15; Napster's Mot. for
Adj., supra note 81.
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15 4

Napster as an Information Location Tool

Napster has chosen not to characterize itself as an Information Location Tool, though a strong argument can be made that this category
aptly describes its function given that it provides users seeking specific
MP3 files with the IP addresses of willing hosts. The RIAA argues that
Napster should fall under this category. 155 If Napster were characterized as an Information Location Tool, it would receive limited liability
under Title II only if it:
(i) does not have actual
knowledge or awareness that the material or
15 6
activity is infringing;
(ii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness,
acts expeditiously to
15 7
remove, or disable access to, the material.
(iii) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the ISP has the right and ability to
control such activity; 158 and
(iv) upon notification of claimed infringement, responds expeditiously to
remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity. 15 9
(i) Knowledge of Copyright Infringement
Napster may have chosen not to classify itself as an Information Location Tool out of concern that it might have difficulty disputing allegations
of its knowledge of infringing activity. 160 It is a paradox of Title II that
an Information Location Tool ISP that only transmits links through its
servers must satisfy this additional test, whereas a Transitory Digital
Network ISP that functions as a conduit for any information whatsoever
does not need to satisfy this test. The statute, as written, creates the
strong incentive for an ISP that could categorize itself as either an Information Location Tool or a Transitory Digital Network to categorize itself
as the latter in order to avoid the knowledge prong of the four-part test.
Proceeding under the assumption that Napster is an Information
Location Tool, the RIAA states in its complaint that Napster is "Well
aware [that] virtually all of the reproductions and distributions it enables and encourages are infringing and in violation of federal copyright
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See id.
Id. at 1.
17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1) (2000).
17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1).
17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(2)-(3).
17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(2)-(3).
See Pierre-Louis Interview, supra note 140.
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and state laws." 16 1 Even if Napster's awareness could not be conclu-

sively proved, the RIAA could have argued that sufficient "red flags" are
available to give Napster constructive knowledge that infringing activity
is taking place with its assistance, thereby disqualifying it from limited
liability under the Information Location Tool exception. In support of
this argument, the RIAA could have quoted the House Judiciary Committee's definition of a "red flag" as including "information of any kind
that a reasonable person would rely upon."' 6 2
Close analysis of Title II and the House Commerce Committee Section-By-Section Analysis of H.R. 2281 ["Commerce Committee Analysis"]
does not provide a clear-cut answer, but leans towards the conclusion
that Napster cannot be deemed to have actual or constructive knowledge
of the potentially copyright-infringing activity of some of its users. The
Commerce Committee Analysis gives as an example of a red flag a situation in which a copyright owner could prove that ".. .the provider was
aware of facts from which infringing activity was apparent if the copyright owner could prove that the location was clearly, at the time the
directory provider viewed it, a "pirate" site..."16 3 Such a site would be

obviously infringing if it contained words such as "pirate" or "bootleg" to
make its illegal purpose obvious.' 6 4 Of the many thousands of MP3 titles viewed by this author, none has ever been seen to contain such incriminating words. The Commerce Committee Analysis notes that the
infringing nature of such pirate sites can be apparent from even "a brief
and casual viewing," but also implies that such a viewing is not required
given that the ISP has "no obligation to seek out copyright infringement."16 5 The Commerce Committee Analysis also states that "[tihe provider could not be expected, during the course of its brief cataloguing
visit, to determine whether the [item] was still protected by copyright or
was in the public domain." 166 Finally, in discussing a subsequent Title
II provision, the Commerce Committee Analysis reiterates that "the Committee does not intend this provision to undermine the. . .knowledge
standard.. .by suggesting that a provider must investigate possible infringements, monitor its service, or make difficult judgments as to
16 7
whether conduct is or is not infringing."
Without an obligation on Napster's part to seek out copyright infringement through its service, and without sufficiently blatant use of
terminology by Napster users indicating their pirating activity, Napster
161. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., No. 99-5183 (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 6, 1999), at para. 1.

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1 (1998), available in 1998 WL 261605, at *65.
H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2 (1998), available in 1998 WL 414916, at *146.
Id. at *147.
Id. at *144.
Id. at *146.
Id. at *152.

780

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XVIII

should be able to prove a lack of knowledge of infringing activity if it
must eventually defend itself under the Information Location Tool
category.
(ii)

Removal of Infringing Material Upon Knowledge of Infringement

Napster argues that it has done what is expected of it under Title II to
prevent copyright infringement through its service. It has posted a detailed copyright policy that states that it will not tolerate infringing ac168
It
tivities and will attempt to halt such activities if properly notified.
has also assigned, in accordance with DMCA requirements, an individual to serve as the Designated Copyright Agent, and provides a notice
form to be submitted to this Agent if copyright violations are observed.169 Napster's readiness to cut service to infringers following
proper notification was demonstrated on May 10, 2000, when the company blocked access to 317,377 people who had been identified by the
heavy-metal rock band Metallica as offering its music illegally through
170
Napster.
The RIAA argues that Napster's compliance with procedural requirements to remove infringing users merely adheres to the letter of the
law, not its spirit. All Napster does to remove copyright infringing users
is to deny them access under their old identification names rather than
blocking their entire IP address. 17 1 This enables infringing users to
1 72
merely log back on under a new identification name.
Given that Napster blocks user access upon proper notification, it
should be deemed to satisfy the requirements of § 512(d)(1)(C). Banning
a specific IP address, as the RIAA has suggested, would be ineffective
because IP addresses are usually assigned randomly as people log onto
their ISP. To block an individual by his "dynamic" IP address would require blocking everybody who uses his same ISP, potentially thousands
of people. That individual could always sign up with another ISP to bypass blockage of his original ISP.
168. See Napster Copyright Policy (visited Apr. 27, 2000) <http://www.napster.com
dmca.html>. [hereinafter Napster] But see Opinion of Judge Marilyn Hall Patel on Def.
Napster, Inc.'s Mot. For Summ. Adj. On the Applicability of the 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) Safe
Harbor Affirmative Defense (N.D. Cal. 2000) (No. C99-05183 MHP), at 13 [hereinafter,
Patel Opinion] (noting that Napster may not have met § 512(i) given that it developed and
notified its users of a formal copyright policy only after the onset of the RIAA's litigation,
and that therefore this should not moot the RIAA's claim to monetary relief for past
harms.).
169. See Napster, supra note 168.
170. See Brad King, Napster Users Get Boot, Wired News (visited May 10, 2000) <http:/
/www.wired.com./news/business/0,1367,36248,00.html>.
171. See Pl.'s Opp'n to Napster's Mot. for Summ. Adj., supra note 15, at 24.
172. See id; <httpJ/www.geocities.com> (providing killnappy.zip, which facilitates the
removal of Napster to permit reloading with a new user id).
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More persuasive, given that Napster does block the IP addresses of
users who run "bots"173 on its service, is that Congress has not stated
how access should be "removed" or "disabled," nor has it specified
whether or not this blockage should be permanent. Napster should not
have to pay the price for this legislative vagueness.
(iii) Direct FinancialBenefit from Copyright Infringement
The RIAA complaint states that Napster derives substantial financial
benefit from the copyright infringement of its users. It claims that "Napster solicits advertising and. . .charges fees for advertising on Napster."1 74 The complaint further states that Napster is "undertaking a
purposeful strategy to make its company more attractive to potential advertisers and investors by increasing the number of users, and thereby
the volume of plaintiffs' sound recordings available for unlawful copying
175
and distribution."
Napster is not currently profitable, but if Napster does eventually
become profitable through revenue sources such as on-line advertising or
subscription fees, will this constitute a direct financial benefit from copyright infringement by its users? Unfortunately, the answer to this question is uncertain because Title II does not provide a substantive
definition for "financial benefit." This leaves it unclear when an ISP has
received a direct financial benefit from infringing activities or whether
such a benefit is merely tangential. 17 6 Courts typically define "financial
benefit" as revenue derived directly from infringing activity. 17 7 It is difficult conceptually to attribute on-line advertising revenue or subscription
fees directly to a specific copyright-infringing product, especially if many
of the products being transferred via the ISP are legitimate, non-copy178
right infringing items.
(iv) Removal of Infringing Material Upon Notification of Infringement
There is no directly infringing material that can be removed from Napster's servers, which store only the titles and locations of music files, not
the files themselves. However, as noted above, Napster has in the past
removed this linking information from its servers and blocked access by
copyright infringers upon proper notification to its Designated Copyright
173. See Patel Opinion, supra note 168, at 14. Bots are programs that perform actions
continuously, such as searching continuously for specific MP3 files. Id. at 16 n.8.
174. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., No. 99-5183 (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 6, 1999), at
para. 68.
175. Id.
176. See Markiewicz, supra note 46, at 427.
177. See id. at 427 n. 49; see also Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264.
178. See id. at 444.
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179

LEGAL CONCLUSION: NAPSTER'S ACTIVITIES ARE PROTECTED BY

TITLE II
According to the preceding analysis, Napster is protected by Title II's
safe harbor provisions. 18 0 At most, then, a court would be able to order
Napster to block an infringing user. Napster argues that there is no
need for even this limited injunctive relief given that it has proved itself
willing to block access to the Napster system if notified of infringing
18
activity. '
The Ninth Circuit ought to adhere to the substantial judicial deference given to Congress in the area of copyright law, under which courts
generally refuse to unilaterally broaden copyright protections in response to technological change.' 8 2 One commentator has noted that
"Congress is the only body capable of answering the specific technical
questions and reconciling the often competing policy interests associated
with the question of liability for online copyright infringement." 8 3 Thus
even if a court feels that the legislature in drafting Title II would have
forbidden a system such as Napster's had it been envisioned, the court
should recognize that this is not its decision to make.
VII.

A.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
TECHNOLOGICAL CAT AND MOUSE GAME

The RIAA has been "tracking and threatening pirates who, in turn,
Is 4
develop ever more sophisticated skill for evading this detection. "
Thus even if the RIAA emerges victorious from its dispute with Napster,
its triumph will be short-lived. Napster's method for facilitating MP3
transfers has already been reproduced by systems such as iMesh,' 8 5
CuteMX,' 86 and SpinFrenzy.' 8 7 Any system such as these could quickly
fill the void left by Napster's disappearance, and from abroad, if necessary, to get beyond the reach of American copyright law.
Even without Napster's system in place, copyright infringement in
the digital age is so widespread that enforcement is nearly impossible.
179. See King, supra note 170.
180. See id.
181. Napster's Mot. for Summ. Adj., supra note 81, at 22.
182. See Davis, supra note 37.
183. Skelton, supra note 68, at 314.
184. Barak D. Jolish, Scuttling the Music Pirate:ProtectingRecordings in the Age of the
Internet, 17 ENT. & SPORTS L. 9, 10 (1999).
185. See <http'J/www.imesh.com> (visited Apr. 27, 2000).
186. See <http'//www.cuteftp.com/products/cutemx> (visited Apr. 27, 2000).
187. See <httpJ/www.spinfrenzy.com/stuflfwelcome.asp> (visited Apr. 27, 2000).
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Traditional pirate web sites that store infringing material are already
difficult to find because they appear and disappear so quickly. Aficionados of pirated music frequently use Internet Relay Chat forums to advise
one another of short-term postings of illegal music archives.' 8 8 Attempting to track down and sue such fleeting entities is not financially feasible
for the music industry. As Ryan Henriquez has noted, "while the industry navigates its victory over one online music provider, numerous other
pirates have already begun their infringing activities, and it is simply
impossible for the music industry to locate and stamp out every instance
of infringement." 18 9
The music industry's much-heralded Secure Digital Music Initiative
(SDMI) will also be unable to stop piracy. In December 1998, a consortium comprised of the RIAA, Universal, Sony, Bertelsmann, EMI, TimeWarner, the International Federation of Phonographic Institutes, and
various technology companies launched SDMI to develop technology that
would prevent unauthorized copies of digital music. 190 As envisioned,
SDMI would either encrypt music or attach a copyright management
system into a music file and travel with the file over the Internet.' 9 '
What the SDMI consortium overlooks is that for every obstacle one can
erect, a counter-technology will be developed if the information content is
valuable enough. This can occur either through hardware or software
modifications.
From a hardware perspective, controlling information flow is difficult when dealing with personal computers, which are designed with an
open architecture. Given that nearly every computer component can be
replaced by the user, decrypted information "can be captured in numer92
ous ways as it passes from one place to another inside the machine."
For example, one could easily modify the functioning of the sound card so
that it not only generates the signal for the speakers but also stores the
19 3
music file onto the hard drive.
With regard to software, the battle against piracy will be equally
difficult. Software systems superior to Napster have already been devel188. See Parker Interview, supra note 16.
189. Ryan S. Henriquez, Facingthe Music on the Internet: Identifying Divergent Strategies for Different Segments of the Music Industry in Approaching Digital Distribution, 7
UCLA ENT. L.R. 57, Fall 1999, at 78.
190. See id. at 87; Jonathan Vankin, Downloading the Future:The MP3 Revolution-the
End of the Industry as We Know It, L.A. WEEKLY, Mar. 26, 1999, at 36.
191. See Henriquez, supra note 189, at 83.
192. See National Research Council, The Digital Dilemma - Intellectual Property in the
Digital Age-Ch. 2 (visited Apr. 27, 2000) <http./books.nap.edu/html/digital-dilemma/
ch2.html> [hereinafter NRC - Ch.2].
193. See id.
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oped, though 19they
are not yet widely used. 194 Unlike Napster, which is
"semi-tiered" 5 and therefore has a central server, the future of information flows could lie with anonymous, "non-tiered"' 9 6 systems that
97
Systems such as SafeX, 19 s
avoid the need for a central server.'
1
99
20 0
20 1
Gnutella,
FreeNet,
and Publius
provide greater user privacy,
are relatively impervious to hacker attack, and in some cases employ in20 2
telligent routing and caching to improve transmission efficiency.
A description of how non-tiered systems operate is best done by example. Suppose User A is seeking a specific file (File #1). User A only
trusts Users B and C to know that he is seeking this information, either
because User A lives in a country that vigorously prosecutes copyright
infringers, or because User A lives in a totalitarian state that will disapprove of his obtaining certain information via computer. User A asks
Users B and C if they have File #1. Unfortunately, they do not, but
User B knows User D and asks him if he has File #1. User D does have
File #1 and immediately transfers it to User B, who immediately forwards it to User A. Because the system is anonymous, User A will never
know that the file came originally from User D. This process is depicted
in the following chart.

Non-Tiered File Transfers
..........................

I

Doyouefle1?-----------------IHbi1
1......User
(

,

,

User CUsr
(bS,9)

lS

I

194. See Thomas E. Weber, Maverick ProgrammersPrepareto Unleash Anarchy on the
Web, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2000, at B1.
195. See Telephone Interview with Jonathan Berschadsky, Patent Attorney (Mar. 22,
2000). Semi-tiered systems involve direct user-to-user interaction following a small amount
of initial assistance by a central server.
196. See Weber, supra note 194; See also Free Network Project, supra note 195. Such
systems are also known as fully distributed, peer-to-peer, or decentralized.
197. See Weekly Interview, supra note 18.
198. Acronym for Secure Anonymous File Exchange. See id.
199. See <http'//gnutella.wego.com> (visited Apr. 27, 2000).
200. See Free Network Project (visited Apr. 27, 2000) <http://freenet.sourceforge.net>,
201. See id. Publius is currently under development.
202. See Free Network Project, supra note 200.
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As can be seen, file transfers via a non-tiered system are made anonymously and only from trusted parties. Even if an Internet copyright
pirate could be identified, he would most likely just be an individual
without deep pockets-an undesirable defendant to a plaintiff seeking a
large monetary award for copyright infringement. With this kind of technology poised for widespread implementation, Napster officials are surprised that the RIAA has no interest in entering into some sort of
commercial arrangement with a semi-tiered system such as Napster,
20 3
where a central server can at least be identified (and negotiated with).
By suing Napster, the RIAA will only succeed in opening the doorway
further to non-tiered systems.
B.

PARADIGM SHIFT IN THE

Music

INDUSTRY

New technology is frequently perceived as a destroyer of the existing
market. In 17th century England, for example,
...the emergence of lending libraries was seen as the death knell of
book stores; in the 201 century, photocopying was seen as the end of the
publishing business, and videotape the end of the movie business. Yet
in each case, the new development produced a new market far larger
than the impact it had on the existing market. Lending libraries gave
inexpensive access to books that were too expensive to purchase,
thereby helping to make literacy widespread and vastly increasing the
20 4
sale of books.
Similarly, photocopies have not destroyed the market for books, and
videotaping has actually increased movie-watching. 20 5 But in each case
the original market was transformed, "in some cases bringing a new cast
of players and a new power structure." 20 6 This process of transformation
can be traumatic to those who depend financially upon the status quo.
The RIAA has resisted technological progress in the audio field over
the past decade, justifying its actions by arguing that "recording artists
would be deprived of copyright fees." 20 7 It squelched the Digital Audio
Tape (DAT) market by lobbying for the AHRA, which imposed a 2% royalty on the sale of each DAT recorder and required imposition of SCMS
anti-copying technology. 20 8 It tried unsuccessfully to prevent Diamond
Multimedia's introduction of the Rio MP3 recorder. Currently the RIAA
is focusing on Internet-based copyright infringement and has success203. See Parker Interview, supra note 16.
204. See NRC - ch.2, supra note 192 (quoting from Carl Shapiro and Hal R. Varian,
INFORMATION RuLEs: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY (1998)).

205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
See id.
Kover, supra note 27, at 129.
See id.
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20 9
fully shut down hundreds of websites trafficking in pirated music.
The music industry thus appears unwilling to adapt to changing times,
suggesting that it has become too comfortable doing things the same old
way. As Jim Griffin, former Technology Director for Geffen Records, has
stated, "No wonder the business is scared. It's going to have to reinvent
itself from the ground up, and that process is going to be a painful
21 0
one."
Given the music industry's rigidity, it is likely that the artists themselves will take the lead in transforming the way music is distributed.
Many have already come to realize that the music industry offers little in
return for the 88 cents on the dollar it extracts from the sale of every
CD. 2 1 1 Chuck D. of the rap group Public Enemy notes that "... .the record companies have been getting away with murder for 12 years, since
the advent of the CD, when they could manufacture something for
69 cents and sell it for $10.98 wholesale." 21 2 There are several new business models that the record industry, individual performance artists,
and on-line music distributors should consider:

1.

Low-Priced Distribution with Convenient Purchasing

This model holds that music should be sold cheaply over the Internet
because "the low price and ease of purchase make it more attractive to
buy than to copy." 2 1 3 Michael Robertson, President and CEO of
MP3.com, believes that "[s]ome music fans will always copy songs illegally... but if you make it easy enough for them to pay for music on the
Net, the majority of them will." 2 14 Barak Jolish recommends:
...a new business model which would focus on delivery of digital music
over the Web at prices substantially lower than today's retail rates.
When combined with low price, the convenience of established industry
web sites might offset the consumer's incentive to engage in piracy in
the first place. Consumers who know that, for instance, they legally can
obtain the single they want for 50 cents may not bother searching
through unreliable pirate sites for the same music. In other words, consumers may be willing to forgo the marginal savings of pirate sites in
2 15
exchange for the industry site's superior convenience and service.
209. See Janelle Brown, Heat Turned Up on DigitalMusic Pirates,Wired.com (Feb. 12,
1998) <http://www.wired.com/news/print version/email/member/culture/story/
10234.html>.
210. Dibbell, supra note 10, at 106.
211. See Vankin, supra note 190, at 36.
212. Id. at 38.
213. National Research Council, The Digital Dilemma - Intellectual Property in the Digital Age-Exec. Summ. (visited Apr. 27, 2000) <http:/books.nap.edu/html]/digital_dilemma/
execsumm.html>.
214. See Dibbell, supra note 10, at 106.
215. See Jolish, supra note 184, at 12.
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In this regard, the music industry can learn an important lesson
from the experience of the software industry, which for years "experimented with a variety of copy-protection mechanisms, trying desperately
to come up with a scheme that consumers would put up with, but in the
end... admitted defeat. Copy protection just adds friction to a product
whose chief value is its frictionlessness." 2 16 The software industry eventually learned to live with a certain amount of piracy, and is currently
quite profitable. 2 17 Jolish argues that the music industry can also continue to be profitable in the digital age, especially given the costs it can
save.
First, distributing music on the Internet would eliminate the expense of pressing CDs, shipping them to the United States, delivering
them to a store, and many other costs associated with retail sales outlets.
Second, the convenience of online delivery and the new attractive pricing
may increase sales volume. The number of impulse buys, for instance,
2 18
undoubtedly would rise.
One website that has adopted this model is GoodNoise, which sells
songs online for 99 cents each. 2 19 These songs are usually by known,
though not upper-tier, artists. 220 GoodNoise splits its profits 50-50 with
the artists whose music is distributed on its site. 22 1 Steve Grady, GoodNoise Vice-President for Marketing, states that "[t]he 99 cents is to some
extent a convenience fee. We want to make it easier for the consumer to
buy the music than to steal it. If you do that effectively, there's a great
22 2
business there."
2.

Mass Customization

The idea of selling songs individually could be seen as a precursor to
the mass customization model already applied by many other industries.
These industries try to give customers more choices by breaking down
their product into its fundamental components, thereby allowing consumers to customize their own solutions. 22 3 For example, the article you
are reading was typed on a computer manufactured by Dell, which permitted the author to select the size of the hard drive, the amount of random-access memory (RAM), the microprocessor speed, the pre-installed
216.
217.
218.
219.

See Dibbell, supra note 10, at 106.
See id. at 106.
Id.
See Vankin, supra note 190, at 36; see also EMUSIC, (visited Apr. 27, 2000) <http:l/

www.goodnoise.com>.
220.
221.
222.
223.
in 2000

See Vankin, supra note 190, at 36.
See id.
See id.
See Allen Weiss, Learning From Napster, UPSIDE TODAY, Mar. 28, 2000, available
WL 4724569.
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software bundle, the type and speed of the modem, etc. Dell understands
that customers increasingly demand the ability to configure the product
they buy.
The music industry, on the other hand, has never embraced the concept of mass customization, which would enable consumers to select specific songs by different artists and then record them onto a customized
CD. 2 2 4 Instead, the music industry continues to expect people to pay up
to $18 for a CD that in some cases contains no more than one or two
desired songs.
Widespread piracy often indicates an unmet customer need. The
need here is for flexibility. Though MP3s enable customers to bypass the
music industry's rigidity by engaging in their own product customization, it may not be too late for the industry to adapt and regain some lost
ground. By enabling consumers to easily customize the CDs they
purchase, the music industry might succeed in taking some of the wind
out of the pirates' sails.
3. Advertiser-Support
This model, which can work in tandem with the Low-Price Mass Distribution model described above, operates by pricing music low or even giving it away for free. Revenue is generated through paid advertisements
2 25
directed towards purchasers browsing the Internet to obtain music.
Many websites currently operate profitably under such a model.
4. Record Companies as Information Providers
Under this model, what is today considered "music piracy" would become openly and legally practiced. MP3 files would be freely available
throughout the Internet, with performers generating revenues through
live performances rather than recordings. Composers would receive royalties from revenues generated by the performers. Traditional CD manufacturers and distributors will have been disintermediated because
performers would now be independently distributing their products online without the assistance of record companies.
Free access to information, however, will likely lead to information
overload. 2 26 Consumers will be unable to determine which music is
worth listening to, and for artists, getting noticed will become more crucial than ever. 22 7 The music industry, having left its traditional role of
physical intermediary, would now assume the role of informational inter224.
225.
226.
227.

See
See
See
See

id.
Vankin, supra note 190, at 40.
id.
id.
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mediary by directing consumers to "better" music. It would generate revenue through advertising or subscription fees to its proprietary websites.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The RIAA's lawsuit against Napster has the potential to define the
parameters of what constitutes copyright infringement in the Internet
age. But regardless of the outcome of this particular case, the rapid pace
of technological change will continue and make it increasingly difficult
for the legal system to protect the status quo of the music industry. If the
industry wishes to survive in this new era, it will be forced to adopt a
more viable business model-one that enables it to embrace the Internet
rather than resist the opportunities it offers.
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